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Lessons Learned Illustration
AS-510 Stage Separation
♦Lesson:  There are NO Small Changes
♦Background – Saturn V Integrated Vehicle Change Processed:  
• Purpose:  Increased payload to the Moon
• Change: 
– Eliminate the ullage settling motors on the S-II stage 
– Eliminate four of the eight retro motors on the S-IC Stage.  
– Delay stage separation and retro motor firing by an additional 1 second to increase 
separation distance.
• Effective: AS-510 was the first flight that incorporated the change. 
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AS-510 Stage Separation
Results of the Change
Excerpts from the AS-510 Flight Evaluation Report
♦S-IC/S-II first and second plane separations were accomplished 
with no significant attitude deviations. 
♦S-IC retro motors performed as expected. 
♦Separation distance was less than predicted. 
♦S-II exhaust plume at engine start resulted in a more severe 
environment at the S-IC forward LOX dome and resulted in S-IC 
telemetry system damage. 
♦Analysis indicates that with an S-IC stage having only four retro 
motors, failure of one retro motor to ignite would result in marginal 
separation distance and, in the 3 sigma case, re-contact of the two 
stages. 
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Post-Flight Assessment of Separation Distance
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Anomaly Investigation Results 
♦The difference between the AS-510 observed and predicted 
separation distance is attributed to a greater F-1 engine "tail off" 
impulse than that used in the separation distance prediction. 
♦The F-1 thrust decay was normal and not appreciably different 
from previous (AS-505 through 509) flights. 
♦Analysis indicates that with an S-IC stage having only four retro 
motors, failure of one retro motor to ignite would result in marginal 
separation distances and, in the 3-sigma case, re-contact of the 
two stages. 
♦S-IC-11 and subsequent flight stages were equipped with eight 
retro motors rather than the planned four. 
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One Retro Motor Failure Assessment Results
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S-IC Stage Thrust Tail Off Based on Flight 
Experience (AS-505 Through 509)
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S-IC Stage Thrust Tail Off Compared with Change 
Analysis Assumption
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Personal Observations from AS-510 Anomaly
(I was a Contractor Propulsion Group Employee at the Time)
Underlying Causes
♦ Change Not Properly Coordinated Between Key Stakeholders
• Change Initially Reviewed by Technical Disciplines
• Propulsion Group Formal Recommendation for Reassessment of F-1 Tailoff and J-2 
Buildup not Acted Upon.
– Separation Dynamics Group Assumed Specification Minimum F-1 Tailoff - Assumption was Non-
Conservative.
• Change Approved without Proper Interdisciplinary Review of Supporting Ground Rules, 
Assumptions, and Analyses Results.
• Checks and Balances not in Place - No “Signoff” Required by Technical Disciplines.
Fallout 
♦ After Formal Internal Investigation, Several Contractor Senior Managers 
were Removed from Assigned Responsibilities.
♦ NASA Senior Manager Career “Sidelined” – Never Recovered
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Lessons Learned Illustration
Propulsion Considerations for Stage Separation
♦ Lesson:  Thrust Tail Off Characteristics of the Lower Stage Propulsion are 
Critical in Stage Separation.
• AS-510 Provides Evidence of Criticality
• Falcon F1 Flight 3 Provides Evidence of Criticality and Consequences.
♦ Background
• Designing vehicle systems for successful stage separation is dependent on 
understanding the interactions of: 
– Lower Stage Propulsion System Thrust During Tail Off
– Upper Stage Start Transient Thrust
– Force Characteristics of Separation Aids (e.g., retro motors, pneumatic pushers) 
– Aerodynamic Forces
– Vehicle Dynamics
• Payload considerations provide motivation to separate a stage as soon as practical 
after its thrust is in tail off.
• Generally, “dragging along” a spent stage prior to separation costs payload.
• Note that a design that separates too early in tail off reduces payload due to additional 
separation aid capability required to compensate for residual tail off impulse.
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Understanding Stage Thrust Tail Off
♦ Determining Tail Off Characteristics Prior to First Flight is Challenging.
• Unless a Diffuser is Used in Ground Test, Liquid Engine and Solid Rocket Motor 
Nozzles Unchoke Before Reaching Low Thrust Levels Typically Required for Stage 
Separation.
• Thus, Defining the Thrust Profile Before First Flight is Challenging.
♦ Shuttle Experience
• Prior to STS-1, Only Ground Test Data Were Available for Low Level Solid Rocket 
Motor (SRM) Tail Off.
• SRM Ground Tests Conducted without a Diffuser.
• Ballistics Model Derived from Ground Test Data to Estimate Thrust Tail Off.
• Conservative Approach to Separation Taken – “Dragged” Boosters Longer than 
Indicated from Ballistic Model.
• Separation Timing Updated Using Approximately 9 Flights (17 Motors) and 
Conservatism Reduced. 
• Additional Updates Performed as Requirements Were Modified and Methodology and 
Database Matured.
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Understanding Lower Stage Thrust Tail Off
♦ Falcon F1 Flight 3 Failure Discussion (Elon Musk): 
• “The problem arose due to the longer thrust decay transient of our new Merlin 1C 
regeneratively cooled engine, as compared to the prior flight that used our old Merlin 
1A ablatively cooled engine.”
• “As it turned out, a very small increase in the time between commanding main engine 
shutdown and stage separation would have been enough to save the mission.” 
• “Unfortunately, the engine chamber pressure is so low for this transient thrust -- only 
about 10 psi -- that it barely registered on our ground test stand in Texas where 
ambient pressure is 14.5 psi.”
• “However, in vacuum that 10 psi chamber pressure produced enough thrust to cause 
the first stage to recontact the second stage.”
♦ Ares I-X Successful Separation
• Ares I-X First Stage Used a Space Shuttle Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) 
Flight Motor.
• Ares I-X Flight Design Made Use of Shuttle RSRM Flight Experience.
• Shuttle Models Derived from Flight Experience Used in Separation Sequence 
Definition.
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Understanding Lower Stage Thrust Tail Off
♦ Most Stage Tail Off Thrust Profiles are Repeatable Flight-to-Flight within 
Definable Limits.
♦ Once Flight Data are Available, the Nominal and Dispersed Tail Off Thrust 
Profile can be Defined and Refined.
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